STATINTL

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CPYRGHT

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Bomb Decision Tests Kennedy

Leadership Is on Question Of Vital After Failure of His Advisers on Cuba

The question mark is in the public domain at last.

Detailed descriptions of this new type of nuclear weapon are being published. Senator Dodd of Connecticut has constituted himself the spokesman for those who believe that the secrecy regarding it is not now, if it ever was, in the public interest.

The basic reason why the lid is off and cannot be put back on is the failure of the nuclear test ban negotiations at Geneva. The Russians not only refused to negotiate seriously; their arrogant, even patronizing, attitudes convinced the American participants that Russia was already doing what Western scientists had warned was in the realm of the possible.

Congressional observers from the Atomic Energy Committee attended some of the Geneva sessions at the request of President Kennedy. [illegible] the views of the reports he was getting. All of them, Democrats and Republicans alike, have been far more reserved in their public statements than Dodd, but they have clearly come down on the side of a renewal of testing.

President Kennedy obviously has to make the final decision. Only he has access to all the information and knows the background of all the problems relating to this latest escapee from Pandora's box.

Almost as important as the decision will be his manner of arriving at it. For him it is a major problem of communication, first with the parties immediately at interest such as the technicians, the military and political experts, his diplomatic advisers and [illegible] whose judgment has been tarnished by

[illegible] in decision-[illegible] which is never [illegible] dealing with arguments to which the flavor of kitchen cabinet attaches.

Cuba was a disaster for him not just because it failed had it succeeded its value was dubious. The charge that clings is that he did not protect the presidency from the consequences of failure. CIA Director Dulles and his deputy, Bissell and Blasier, are expendable even though they have not yet been expended, but the presidency is not.

Kennedy did not improve on this situation with his own impulsive direction of the prisoners-for-tractors exchange. Now that has fallen flat and it was all too plain early in the game that both Kennedy and Khrushchev have been playing for that end with each other. Agreed [illegible] this is too [illegible] a busy [illegible] to the [illegible] Ban [illegible] much [illegible] politically [illegible] the [illegible] damage to [illegible] leadership [illegible] principle [illegible] The irony [illegible] Kennedy [illegible] books, [illegible] matters, [illegible] great [illegible] Appar- [illegible] people [illegible] about [illegible] them [illegible] White [illegible] counties of the [illegible] past. [illegible] President [illegible] not need to delegate [illegible] but to exercise it; [illegible] not need to negotiate [illegible] but to expand it.

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